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Torts-False Imprisonment and Arrest-Powers of a Merchant to De-
tain Suspected Shoplifters
The new amendment to North Carolina General Statute section 14-
72.1' is obviously intended to expand the freedom of a merchant, his
employees, and police officers to detain and arrest suspected shoplifters.
As the immunity from civil liability is limited to circumstances in which
the detention is "in a reasonable manner for a reasonable time" and the
detention or arrest was made for "probable cause", one might question
whether the area of freedom is greater now than under the common law
or prior statutory enactment. The purpose of this note is to explore
changes in the state of the law as it applies to the situation of the
merchant. 2
The amendment does not expand a merchant's immunity from suit
for malicious prosecution. Probable cause to institute criminal proceed-
ings against a plaintiff has always been and remains a complete defense
to the plaintiff's action for malicious prosecution.' The significant
change in the law comes in the extension of the merchant's immunity
from a suit for false imprisonment. Any detention of a person against
'The amendment added sub-section (c) to North Carolina General Statutes section 14-72.1,
which follows as amended:
(a) Whoever, without authority, willfully conceals the goods or merchandise of any
store, not theretofore purchased by such person, while still upon the premises of such
store, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .Such goods or merchandise found con-
cealed upon or about the person and which have not theretofore been purchased by such
person shall be prima facie evidence of a willful concealment.
(c) A merchant, or his agent or employee, or a peace officer who detains or causes
the arrest of any person shall not be held civilly liable for detention, malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, or false arrest of the person detained or arrested, where such
detention is in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time, if in detaining or
in causing the arrest of such person, the merchant, or his agent or employee, or the peace
officer had at the time of the detention or arrest probable cause to believe that the person
committed the offense created by this section. If the person being detained by the mer-
chant, or his agent or employee, is a minor 16 years df age or younger, the merchant or
his agent or employee, shall call or notify, or make a reasonable effort to call or notify
the parent or guardian of the minor, during the period of detention.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1 (1971 Advance Legislative Service Pamphlet No. 4). The 1971 amend-
ment became effective on July 31, 197 1.
2This note will not discuss the effect of the amendment on the powers of agents or employees
of the merchant. Under general principles of agency the powers of the employee would be the same
as the powers of a merchant once the determination is made that he is acting within the scope of
his employment.
3Carson v. Doggett, 231 N.C. 629, 58 S.E.2d 609 (1950).
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his will without lawful authority makes out a prima facie case for false
imprisonment or false arrest.4 In contrast to a suit for malicious prose-
cution, probable cause is not a complete defense. Once an involuntary
detention has been made, the only complete defense to the action is legal
authority or justification to have made the detention, which may be
either a power to arrest or a privilege to detain conferred by statute or
common law. If the circumstances are. such as to give rise to a privilege,
probable cause is one of the necessary elements for invoking the pri-
vilege.
The new amendment extends the defense of probable cause to some
situations in which there was formerly no legal justification for the arrest
and creates a new privilege of detention short of actual arrest when
merchants have probable cause to suspect someone of the specific crime
defined in the statute. By increasing the amount of protection afforded
by the defense of probable cause, the legislature has created broad new
powers of detention by a merchant. The changes effected in the mer-
chant's power to arrest and privilege to make an involuntary detention
will be examined in turn.
POWERS OF ARREST
Under prior law a merchant acted at his peril when he made an
arrest by taking a person into legal custody without a warrant. A private
person could arrest another for a misdemeanor without a warrant only
when a breach of the peace had been committed in his presence.5 There
was no statutory or common law authority for an arrest without a
warrant for other misdemeanors such as the crime of willful concealment
defined by section 14-72. 1.6 Such an arrest for willful concealment con-
stituted false arrest, and the defense of probable cause would not have
been available to the merchant. Probable cause to suspect a person of
an offense did not supply an otherwise nonexistent legal authority for
an arrest or detention.
The fact that a police officer arrested the plaintiff would not in itself
have insulated the merchant from liability for false arrest if the merchant
caused the arrest to be made. 7 If the merchant gave the officer the
'Hoffman v. Clinic Hospital, Inc., 213 N.C. 669, 197 S.E. 161 (1938).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-39 (1965).
6See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 978 (2d ed. 1969).
'This statement was made without further explanation in Long v. Eagle Co., 214 N.C. 146,
198 S.E. 573 (1938), and cited with approval in Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568,
133 S.E.2d 225 (1963). This is not a complete statement of the law on this point, however. The
treatment in the text goes beyond this North Carolina dictum.
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relevant information and left the decision to arrest with him, the mer-
chant was protected by the officer's intervention.' If, however, the arrest
was made solely at the instigation and upon the direction of the mer-
chant, the arrest would not have been valid merely because made by the
police and not by the merchant The law is unchanged as it applies to
misdemeanors other than willful concealment of unpurchased merchan-
dise, but for that crime the new amendment protects the merchant from
liability for an invalid arrest whenever he "causes an arrest" with proba-
ble cause to suspect the person of willful concealment.
The powers of a police officer to make an arrest for a misdemeanor
without a warrant were also limited. He could arrest without a warrant
only when the misdemeanor was in fact being committed in his presence
or when he had reasonable grounds to believe one was being comitted
in his presence. 10 Seemingly, willful concealment of unpurchased mer-
chandise could occur in the officer's presence if he were summoned by a
merchant to the scene, but the reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was being committed in his presence had to be based on the immediate
senses of the officer; reports of third parties, even those of a merchant,
were not sufficient legal grounds for belief." If the officer made the
arrest without reasonable grounds, he acted at his peril. If a crime had
not been committed, he would have been liable for false arrest. The new
amendment would apparently protect him from this liability for an
arrest for the specific crime of willful concealment if he has "probable
cause," which apparently can be interpreted to allow the belief to be
'In such a situation the defendant was found not liable for false arrest in Alexander v. Lindsey,
230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470 (1949), but the court did not state this as a principle of the law. A
good case on the point is Vimont v. S.S. Kresge Co., 291 S.W. 159, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
There the court said:
[lf the defendant directs a police officer to take the plaintiff into custody, he is necessar-
ily liable to respond in damages for a resulting false imprisonment; but if, to the contrary,
the defendant merely states the facts to the officer, leaving it with him . . . to act or
not, as [he] see[s] fit, the defendant is not liable. The rule is eminently founded on reason.
To hold to the contrary would entirely destroy the right of the humble citizen, to whom
the patrolman on the beat. . . represents the majesty of the law and to whom for many
reasons the advice of counsel may be unavailable, to tell his troubles and difficulties to
such officer, and to trust to the power and discretion of the legally constituted authorities
to secure for him the rights which the law guaranteed him.
'Similarly, if the merchant gives information to the police officer which is misleading, the
merchant would be liable for the resulting arrest. Wehrman v. Liberty Petroleum Co., 382 S.W.2d
56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (1965).
"Note, Criminal Law-Arrest without Warrant for Misdemeanor, 35 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1957).
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based on reports of third parties.1 2 If the crime was actually being com-
mitted in the presence of the officer, the arrest would be valid even under
prior law.
When the statute refers to a police officer who "causes an arrest,"
the clear intent is to protect the officer who makes the arrest himself;
the construction should not be limited to the situation in which the
officer directs the arrest by another party. This obvious interpretation
creates problems when applied to "a merchant . . . who . . . causes an
arrest."' Both "merchant" and "peace officer" are parallel antece-
dents of the same relative clause. The same clause would have the same
meaning for both its antecedents in a consistent construction of the
sentence. However, the phrase "causes an arrest" seems to be more than
an excess of language and apparently serves to limit the mode of arrest.
This interpretation makes more sense when applied to a merchant than
a police officer.
Nine other states have enacted statutes that grant immunity to a
merchant who "causes" an arrest with probable cause, but none of the
statutes explicitly provides immunity when the merchant makes an ar-
rest himself, and no court has so construed any of the statutes.14 Only
two states explicitly extend immunity to merchants who make arrests
themselves.' 5 Two others do so indirectly. 6 Thus that form of immunity
is available only in a decided minority of the states by statute.
Irrhis is so because the arrest statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (1965), empowers a police
officer to arrest without a warrant when he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that a
misdemeanor was committed "in his presence." While reasonable grounds for belief might ordinar-
ily be founded on reports of third parties, the additional requirement that the grounds justify a belief
that it was committed in his presence requires that the reasonable grounds be limited to facts known
to the officer through his "immediate senses." Note, 35 N.C.L. REv., supra note 11. As the statute
which grants civil immunity to the officer contains no such phrase, reports from third parties are
not necessarily excluded.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1(c) (1971 Advance Legislative Service Pamphlet No. 4). See note
I supra.
1These nine states and their statutory provisions are ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 334(3) (1958); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 811.022(4) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551A(c) (1971); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-402.03 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-100 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-27(3)
(1960); Oio REV. CODE § 2935.041 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-826 (Supp. 1970); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.1-126 (Supp. 1971).
"GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1005 (1968); TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1436e(2) (Supp. 1970).
"Iln Arizona "reasonable cause" to believe that the suspect was committing a crime of
shoplifting or willful concealment is a defense to false arrest, including the situation where the
merchant makes an arrest without a warrant. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-675 (Supp. 1970). The
%Vest Virginia statute makes "shoplifting" a breach of the peace, and merchants have common
law authority to arrest for breaches of the peace committed in their presence. W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-3A-4 (Supp. 1971).
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The problem of construction of this provision will eventually come
before the courts in North Carolina. Although the immunity extended
to the merchant and to the police officer should be different in each case
for policy reasons, the form of the statute makes difficult any construc-
tion which would both limit the power of a merchant to make arrests
and preserve the power of a police officer to make them. However, there
is no obvious intent expressed in the statute to extend immunity to
merchants who make rather than cause arrests. To base a radical change
in the law on an implication in the statute rather than an explicit provi-
sion would be questionable policy on the part of any court.
POWERS TO MAKE INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS
In a minority of American jurisdictions there is clear authority
under the common law for an involuntary detention that does not
amount to an arrest. An old principle has been applied to the new legal
situation created by shoplifting in self-service stores. The personal inter-
est in freedom of movement, which the tort of false imprisonment seeks
to protect, is limited by a second right: that of a person to defend his
property from theft or interference by another. In the California case of
Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., 17 a man was seen by several store employees
to put various articles in his pockets. As he was leaving the store, he was
stopped by a female store detective who escorted him to an upstairs
room under threat of calling the police. There he was detained for ques-
tioning for twenty minutes until he was actually arrested by the police.
The court held that a property owner was justified in detaining a person
when he had probable cause to believe the person was stealing his prop-
erty. The detention must be only for the purposes of investigation of the
circumstances,18 and the investigation must be conducted in a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable time. 9 Whether there was probable cause
175 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
"
8 Examples of improper purposes of detention are Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696,
707, 155 S.W.2d 74, 79 (1941) (extorting a confession), and Banks v. Food Town, Inc., 98 So. 2d
719, 721 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (dictum) (conducting a search without a warrant).
"A third limitation set by the court was that the privilege was applicable only in cases where
the suspect was believed to be stealing property "as distinguished from those where the offense has
been completed." 5 Cal. 2d at 180, 54 P.2d at 23. This limitation was ignored in a case decided
live days later in which the suspect was detained when he had already stolen an article and was on
the sidewalk outside the store. Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., I I Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24
(1936). This limitation has subsequently been ignored by jurisdictions which have followed Collyer
in other respects. See Comment, The Protection and Recapture of Merchandise from Shoplifters,
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 82 (1952); cases cited note 21 infra.
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to make the detention was said to be a question of law for the court. 0
Eight American jurisdictions have adopted this rule by court deci-
sion as a defense to the common law tort. 2' The Restatement (Second)
of Torts codified the position in its section 120A, which has in its turn
influenced the law.22 The significance of this development is that it gives
the merchant the right to make an involuntary detention within these
limits.
Four jurisdictions have considered the doctrine and have rejected it,
asserting that probable cause is no defense to an action for false impri-
sonment even if defense of property is concerned.23
North Carolina has not specifically rejected the doctrine by court
decision. Two cases have reached the North Carolina Supreme Court
since Collyer was decided in which defense of property might have been
held a justification for the detention of a suspected shoplifter. One suit
was dismissed on the grounds that the detention was voluntary.24 In the
other liability was found without mention of the doctrine in the court's
opinion, even though the issue was squarely raised in the brief for the
defendants.5 One may assume that the issue may be raised again in a
"5 Cal. 2d at 181, 54 P.2d at 23. This was clarified in later decisions to mean that if there
was a conflict in the evidence, the question must go to the jury with appropriate instructions from
the court. Note, Torts: False Imprison: Probable Cause: Instruction on Conflicting Facts, 3
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 269 (1956).
"
1Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Wailer, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945); Sima v.
Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc., 82 Idaho 387, 353 P.2d 1085 (1960); Durand v. United Dollar
Store, Inc., 242 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Teel v. May Dep't Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155
S.W.2d 74 (1941); Swafford v. Vermillion, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953); Cohen v. Lit. Bros., 166
Pa. Super. 206, 70 A.2d 419 (1950) (Collyer doctrine applied without discussion); Lopez v. Wigwam
Dep't Stores, Inc., 49 Hawaii 416, 421 P.2d 289 (1966) (doctrine applied without discussion).
Tennessee adopted the doctrine in Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13
(1943), and a later court distinguished detention from arrest saying that probable cause is no defense
when an arrest is made by a private person. Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn.
App. 421, 181 S.W.2d 638 (1944).
22RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965) has been cited with approval in two
jurisdictions which follow the doctrine. Proulx v. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 343
Mass. 390, 178 N.E.2d 575 (1961) (Tent. draft No. 1, 1957, cited); Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dep't
Store, 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 (1968). It was cited with approval but not followed in
Roberts v. Hecht Co., 280 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1968).
=Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947); Clark's Brooklyn
Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967); Herbrick v. Samardick & Co., 169
Neb. 833, 101 N.W.2d 488 (1960) (dissent advocates adoption of the Collyer doctrine); Zayre, Inc.
v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966). In each of these states there are now statutes
extending some form of immunity to merchants who detain suspected shoplifters. See note 27 infra.
4Black v. Clark's Greensboro, Inc., 263 N.C. 226, 139 S.E.2d 199 (1964).
2Brief for Defendant at 8, Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568, 133 S.E.2d 225
(1963). The two cases are discussed in Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law.
43 N.C.L. REV. 873, 909-12 (1965).
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similar case before the court on the premise that the court has left it open
for consideration at a later date. Thus the existence of the privilege at
common law in North Carolina is problematic at best.
The spread of the Collyer doctrine in the courts has been slow,2"
while the desire of shopkeepers for increased immunity from suit has
been great. The result of this frustration has been a virtual explosion of
statutory enactments of which North Carolina's is only the most recent
example. Forty-one states now have statutes extending some form of
immunity to merchants who detain suspected shoplifters."
In order to assess the scope of the new power of a merchant to
detain, one may compare North Carolina's new statute to the statutory
patterns that have emerged in the other states. The most notable fact
"Since 1936 less than one-fifth of the American jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine. See
notes 21-22 & accompanying text supra.
2Trhe following statutes are substantially similar to North Carolina's amended statute, con-
taining immunity provisions for detention: ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 334 (1958); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-5-31 (Supp. 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, §§ 646-47 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 811.022 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1005 (1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 663-2 (1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3042, -3046
(Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.22-709.24 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-535b
(1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 433.236 (Supp. 1968); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 215 (1967); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 551A (1971); MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 231, § 94B (Supp. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.2917 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (Supp. 1971); MIss. CODE ANN. § 2374-04
(Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.125 (Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402.01 (1965); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 598.030 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-100 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-
16-22 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218 (McKinney 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-27
(1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.041 (Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1343 (Supp. 1970);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 164.392 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-359.4 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-
825 to -826 (Supp. 1970); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1436e (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-13-
30, -32 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.220 (1961), 9.01.116 (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-3A-4 (Supp. 1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (Supp. 1971); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-
146.3 (Supp. 1971).
Other states have statutes with various idiosyncrasies. Montana and Vermont give a merchant
the right to request any individual to place or keep in full view merchandise which he has removed
from display counters. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-213 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2566
(Supp. 1971).
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota extend immunity only when the suspect actually
concealed unpurchased merchandise. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3492 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4816.1(b) (1963); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-37-24 (1967).
Arizona alone imposes no limitation that the detention must have been for a reasonable time
in a reasonable manner. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-675 (Supp. 1970).
Virginia exempts a merchant from civil liability only when he causes an arrest and does not
provide immunity when he detains. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-126 (Supp. 1971).
Eight jurisdictions have no statute protecting merchants who detain or cause arrest of sus-
pected shoplifters: Alaska, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maine, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
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about section 14-72.1 is the absence of an express limitation of the
purpose for which detentions may be made by a merchant. Only three
other states have enacted similar statutes without limiting detention to
a specific purpose.28 The common law privilege to detain is usually
limited to the purpose of investigation of the circumstances. Fourteen
states have followed this example and have limited the statutory privilege
in the same way. 29 Twelve other states have gone beyond this and have
declared that detention may be made when there is at least a reasonable
possibility of recovery of the goods. 3 Three states have gone so far as
to authorize involuntary searches of the person or seizures of goods on
reasonable cause to believe that merchandise has been or is being sto-
len.31 At the other end of the spectrum, Wisconsin and Minnesota specif-
ically exclude any involuntary interrogation of the suspect. They and
three other states limit the purpose of the detention to the summoning
of a police officer. 32
The lack of a specified purpose for a detention creates problems in
interpreting the scope of the privilege. Does it include the privilege to
search the person detained and to seize goods in his possession? Even if
the statute were construed to protect a merchant who arrests without a
warrant, as discussed earlier, the arrest would not be a lawfuf one so that
a search of the person could be justified as incident to a lawful arrest.
2The three states are Maryland, Massachusetts, and Michigan. See statutes cited note 27
supra.
"Fourteen states have limited the privilege to investigation of the circumstances or questioning
of the detainee: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New York,
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Mississippi grants a
right to question but no accompanying right to detain. Oklahoma is unusual in allowing detention
for almost any purpose, including questioning, informing the police, performing a "reasonable
search," and recovering the merchandise. See statutes cited note 27 supra.
ODetention for the purpose of effecting recovery of goods reasonably thought to have been
unlawfully taken is allowed in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, New Jersey, and North Dakota. See statutes cited note 27
supra. Pennsylvania authorizes detention for recovery only when goods have actually been con-
cealed. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1(b) (1963).
31lowa allows searches by merchants without a warrant under the direction of a police officer.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.22 to -23 (Supp. 1971). Oklahoma allows "reasonable searches" when it
appears the merchandise may otherwise be lost. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1343(e) (Supp. 1970).
Texas authorizes "all persons" to "prevent the consequences of shoplifting by seizing any goods
...which has [sic] been so taken . .. on reasonable grounds to suppose that the crime of
shoplifting to have [sic] been committed. ... TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1436e(2) (Supp. 1970).
2DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 646 (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (Supp. 1971);
Otuo REV. CODE § 2935.041 (Supp. 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-37-24 (1967); and
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (Supp. 1971).
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A court might decide that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to search
the person or seize goods in his possession. No federal constitutional
right is at stake; the fourth amendment protects citizens only from
governmental searches and seizures and not those by private persons.3"
If the issue is left to a jury,34 there appears to be no reason why they
might not find a search or seizure to have been done "in a reasonable
manner" in terms of the statute under the particular circumstances of a
case.
Other states have incorporated limits as to what constitutes a "rea-
sonable manner for a reasonable length of time" in the language of the
statute. There are presumptive limits on "reasonable time": not more
than thirty minutes in West Virginia 5 or one' hour in Louisiana;3" until
the police arrive after being promptly notified in South Dakota3" and
Wisconsin;3" and for time to permit a person to make or refuse to make
a statement and time to examine records in Hawaii39 and Washington.4"
The statutes of two other states indicate the limits of a "reasonable
manner" of detention. Wisconsin4 requires that all detainees be allowed
to make telephone calls and, with Minnesota,42 forbids an involuntary
interrogation of the suspect. Although there are no other limitations on
the manner of detention, North Carolina does require that when a minor
is detained a reasonable attempt must be made to notify his parent or
guardian during the detention.4 3
Another area of uncertainty in defining the scope of detention is
"probable cause." Among the courts that have considered this phrase
in similar statutes, the determination has been that probable cause is a
"Moreover, the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches and seizures which are
made under governmental authority, real or assumed, or under color of such authority." Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921). The provisions of the fourth amendment were applied to
the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
34ln Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425 (App. Div. 1967), a directed
verdict for the defendant was affirmed even though plaintiff had been detained for thirty minutes
before the police were summoned. This was held insufficient to support a jury finding of detention
for an "unreasonable time" as required by statute. The statute is cited in note 27 supra.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (Supp. 1971).
3'LA. CODE CRINI. PRO. art. 215 (1967).
3S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-37-24 (1967).
38Vis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (Supp. 1971).
31HAWAIi REV. LAWS § 663-2 (1967).
'"WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.116 (Supp. 1970).
41WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (Supp. 1970).
'
2MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (Supp. 1971).
41N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1(c) (1971 Advance Legislative Service Pamphlet No. 4).
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question of law for the court that goes to the jury only where the facts
are in conflict and then with an appropriate instruction as to which facts,
if believed, constitute probable cause." A mere suspicion will not suf-
fice.45 A "strong suspicion" will when there are objective facts to justify
it.46 A customer who lingers over and handles certain items may not be
detained,47 but one who puts an article around her waist,4" in her purse, 49
or in his pocket 0 may be detained. And yet a man who put an ascot
around his neck as he left a store was held to have been unreasonably
detained.5' The conclusion is that there must be specifically observed
facts to support a belief that the crime was being committed. As the
privilege in section 14.72.1 is specifically limited to the crime of willful
concealment, one would have to point to facts indicating that the specific
crime of willful concealment was being committed. This limitation nar-
rows the scope of the privilege considerably.
Circumstances which would not independently justify a detention
may do so when viewed in relation to prior events or knowledge-for
example, when police warnings to be on the lookout for teen-age shoplif-
ters have been issued, 52 or when the merchant is familiar with the suspect
and has missed articles at other times when he was present. 53 A suspect
may not be forcibly detained when other methods of investigating exist,
such as checking a sales slip against purchases.54 The burden of showing
probable cause under the statute is a considerable one, and it rests
squarely on the shoulders of the merchant who takes action. 55
"Jefferson Stores, Inc. v. Caudell, 228 So. 2d 99 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969); Dixon v. S.S. Kresge,
Inc., 119 Ga. App. 776, 169 S.E.2d 189 (1969); Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore.
538, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
"Butler v. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss. 1969).
'Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., --- Mass. _ 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971).
"Butler v. Walker Stores, 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss. 1969).
"Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
"Stienbaugh v. Payless Drug Store, Inc., 75 N.M. 118,401 P.2d 104 (1965).
'Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
"Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., - Mass. - 268 N.E.2d 860 (1971).
"Meadows v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 254 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Fla. 1966).
OBurnaman v. J.C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960). See also Doyle v. Douglas,
390 P.2d 871 (Okla. 1964).
"Frught v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 160 So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
"Butler v. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss. 1969); J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss.
1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963); Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Ill Ohio App. 537, 174
N.E.2d 128 (1959).
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CONCLUSIONS
Two general conclusions may be drawn concerning the effect of the
amendment on previous law. First, the amendment clears up the confu-
sion in the common law as to whether the merchant can make an inv-
oluntary detention in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length
of time. He may do so as long as he has probable cause to believe that
the person committed the specific crime of willful concealment. The
privilege is not as broad as the common law privilege because it is tied
to a specific crime. The statutory privilege apparently would not provide
immunity for a merchant who detains a shoplifter who attempts to leave
the store with goods that are not concealed. In another respect the
statutory privilege is broader. While the common law privilege is limited
to detentions for the purpose of investigation, there is no equivalent
limitation on the statutory privilege. As a result important problems of
construction are raised.
Second, the amendment clearly exempts a merchant from civil lia-
bility when he causes an arrest by a police officer on probable cause to
believe the crime of willful concealment is being committed, despite the
fact that the merchant may not have observed the procedure necessary
under prior law of merely giving information to the police officer. How-
ever, the fact that this immunity is limited to the specific crime created
by section 14-72.1 may hold hidden pitfalls for a merchant who directs
an arrest for other types of larceny.
Inflammatory confrontations between merchants jealous of their
wares and citizens jealous of their rights will inevitably lead to litigation
over this ill-defined new power granted to the merchant. Perhaps the
North Carolina courts will then resolve the numerous problems asso-
ciated with the statute. Regardless of the outcome, however, one must
conclude that a statute more closely modeled on the common law pri-
vilege of the merchant to detain suspected shoplifters would have better
served both the public and the merchants.
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